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Abstract 
We construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information where contingent 
upon winning or losing, the payoff of a player is a linear function of prizes, own effort, and the 
effort of the rival. This structure nests a number of existing contests in the literature and can be 
used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and 
show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different types of contests and 
hence different equilibrium effort levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: C72, D72, D74 
Keywords: rent-seeking, contest, spillover 
 
Corresponding author: Subhasish M. Chowdhury; E-mail: s.modak-chowdhury@uea.ac.uk     
 2 
1. Introduction 
Contests are economic or social interactions in which two or more players expend costly 
resources in order to win a prize. The resources expended by players determine their probability 
of winning a prize. In this article we construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete 
information. We consider a simple two-player contest where, contingent upon winning or losing, 
a player receives different prizes. Players’ outcome-contingent payoffs are linear functions of 
prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival.1 This structure nests a number of existing contests 
in the literature and can be used to analyze new types of contests. We characterize the unique 
symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially 
different types of contests and hence different equilibrium effort levels. 
The rent-seeking contest literature originated with Tullock (1980). In this model, player 
𝑖’s probability of winning is 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = 𝑥𝑖
𝑟/(𝑥𝑖
𝑟 + 𝑥𝑗
𝑟), where 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗 are the efforts of players 
𝑖 and 𝑗. The function, 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗), that maps efforts into probabilities of winning is called the 
contest success function (CSF). The most popular versions of the Tullock CSF are the lottery (𝑟 
= 1) and the all-pay auction (𝑟 = ∞).2 There are several reasons why Tullock’s CSF is widely 
employed. First, a number of studies have provided axiomatic justification for it (Skaperdas 
1996; Clark and Riis 1998). Second, Baye and Hoppe (2003) have identified conditions under 
which a variety of rent-seeking contests, innovation tournaments, and patent-race games are 
strategically equivalent to the Tullock contest. 
Economists often use modified payoffs in the Tullock contest in order to address specific 
research questions. For example, Skaperdas and Gan (1995) restrict the losing payoff to study the 
effect of risk aversion in a “limited liability” contest. Cohen and Sela (2005) restrict the winning 
payoff to show that in certain contests a weaker contestant can win with higher probability than a 
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stronger contestant. Many other studies use modified payoffs in the Tullock contest, a short list 
of example includes Chung (1996), Alexeev and Leitzel (1996), Lee and Kang (1998), 
Amegashie (1999), Glazer and Konrad (1999), Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000), Grossman and 
Mendoza (2001), Öncüler and Croson (2005), and Matros and Armanios (2009). 
In this article we propose a generalized Tullock contest in which payoffs are linear 
functions of prizes, own effort, and the effort of the rival. Our model nests a number of the 
existing contests in the literature and also provides a framework for studying new contests. One 
of the main motivations for introducing a generalized structure is the fact that in many real life 
contests payoffs are endogenous, i.e., payoffs depend both on the individual and on the rival's 
effort. For example, in innovation contests one firm’s R&D effort may provide information 
spillovers that benefit its rival (D’Aspremont and Jacquemin 1988; Kamien et al. 1992). In a 
patent race the expenditure of a rival can decrease the patent value for the winner, creating a 
negative spillover (Alexeev and Leitzel 1996). Negative spillovers are often observed in military 
conflicts between countries (Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2000) or in biological survival contests 
(Baker 1996). Another example where spillovers are important is litigation (Farmer and Pecorino 
1999; Baye et al. 2005). Depending on the litigation system, losers have to compensate winners 
for a portion of their legal expenditures or up to the amount actually spent by the loser. These 
create either negative or positive spillover effects of one party’s expenditure on another. Baye et 
al. (2010) model the spillovers in terms of an all-pay auction contest. We explicitly model such 
spillovers in the context of a Tullock lottery contest.3 
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2. Theoretical model 
We consider a two-player contest with two prizes. The players are denoted by 𝑖 and 𝑗. 
Both players value the winning prize as 𝑊 > 0 and the losing prize as 𝐿 ∈ ℝ. We assume that 
winning the prize provides higher valuation than losing, i.e., 𝑊 > 𝐿. Players simultaneously 
expend irreversible and costly efforts 𝑥𝑖 ≥ 0 and 𝑥𝑗 ≥ 0. The probability of player 𝑖 winning the 
contest is described by a Tullock lottery CSF: 
𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑥𝑖/(𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗)     if  𝑥𝑖 + 𝑥𝑗 ≠ 0
1/2                     if  𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0
      (1) 
Contingent upon winning or losing, the payoff for player 𝑖 is a linear function of prizes, 
own effort, and the effort of the rival: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗            with probability          𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗              with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
  (2) 
where 𝛼1, 𝛼2 are cost parameters, and 𝛽1, 𝛽2 are spillover parameters. To ensure that a player 
has no incentive to expend infinite effort, we impose conditions that a player’s own effort has a 
negative direct impact on his winning payoff and a non-positive direct impact on his losing 
payoff, that is, 𝛼1 < 0 and 𝛼2 ≤ 0. 
We define the contest described by (1) and (2) as Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω), where Ω =
{𝑊, 𝐿, 𝛼1, 𝛼2, 𝛽1, 𝛽2} is the parameter space. All parameters in Ω along with the CSF are common 
knowledge for both players. The players are assumed to be risk neutral; therefore, for a given 
effort pair (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗), the expected payoff for player 𝑖 in contest Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, Ω) is: 
𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) =
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗) +
𝑥𝑗
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
(𝐿 + 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗)   (3) 
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where (𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) ≠ (0,0). For 𝑥𝑖 = 𝑥𝑗 = 0, the expected payoff is 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) = (𝑊 + 𝐿)/2. By 
setting 𝐴 = 𝑊 − 𝐿 + (𝛽1 − 𝛽2)𝑥𝑗, 𝐵 = 𝛼1 − 𝛼2, and 𝐶 = 𝐿 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗, expression (3) can be 
rewritten as: 
 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) = 𝐵
𝑥𝑖
2
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
+ 𝐴
𝑥𝑖
𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗
+ 𝛼2𝑥𝑖 + 𝐶      (4) 
Player 𝑖’s best response is derived by maximizing 𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)) with respect to 𝑥𝑖. 
Differentiating equation (4) with respect to 𝑥𝑖 yields the following first order condition: 
𝑑𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗))
𝑑𝑥𝑖
= 𝐵
𝑥𝑖
2+2𝑥𝑖𝑥𝑗
(𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗)
2 + 𝐴
𝑥𝑗
(𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗)
2 + 𝛼2      (5) 
The second order condition is:  
𝑑2𝐸(𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖,𝑥𝑗))
𝑑𝑥𝑖
2 = (𝐵𝑥𝑗 − 𝐴)
2𝑥𝑗
(𝑥𝑖+𝑥𝑗)
3       (6) 
From the second order condition (6) it is easy to verify that the payoff function for player 
𝑖 is concave as long as: 
𝑥𝑗 ≤
𝑊−𝐿
(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
         (7) 
If (7) holds then first order condition is necessary and sufficient for maximizing player 
𝑖’s payoff. Consequently by solving (5) for 𝑥𝑖 and by substituting back the values of 𝐴 and 𝐵, we 
receive the best response function of 𝑥𝑖 in terms of the effort choice of 𝑥𝑗:  
𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹 = −𝑥𝑗 + √
{(𝛼1−𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)}𝑥𝑗
2−{𝑊−𝐿}𝑥𝑗
𝛼1
      (8) 
if 𝑥𝑗 ≤ (𝑊 − 𝐿)/(−𝛼2 − 𝛽1 + 𝛽2); and 𝑥𝑖
𝐵𝑅𝐹 = 0, otherwise.4 It is clear that the best response 
function (8) depends on 𝛼1, 𝛼2, the difference between 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, and the spread between the 
winning and the losing prize valuations.  
By simultaneously solving best response functions (8), and accounting for symmetric 
Nash equilibrium we obtain the unique equilibrium in which player 𝑖 and 𝑗 expend efforts of 
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𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑥 =
(𝑊−𝐿)
−(3𝛼1+𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
       (9) 
The expected equilibrium payoff in the symmetric equilibrium is given by: 
𝐸∗(𝜋) =
(𝛽2−𝛼1)(𝑊−𝐿)
−(3𝛼1+𝛼2)−(𝛽1−𝛽2)
+ 𝐿       (10) 
Both the non-negative equilibrium effort condition and the second order condition hold if 
−(3𝛼1 + 𝛼2) − (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) > 0. Furthermore, to ensure that both players are willing to expend 
positive efforts in equilibrium the equilibrium payoff has to be greater than or equal to the payoff 
of losing, i.e., 𝐸∗(𝜋) ≥ 𝐿. This condition translates into 𝛽2 − 𝛼1 ≥ 0 and it means that the unit 
cost of winning has to be lower than the unit spillover benefit from losing. 
 
3. Existing contests in the literature 
3.1. Contests without spillovers 
In the standard contest defined by Tullock (1980), both players have the same valuation 
for the prize and despite the outcome of the contest the efforts of both players are lost. In such a 
case, 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 = −1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. The best response function 
for player 𝑖 is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗  (Figure 1). The unique equilibrium is the symmetric 
equilibrium with 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/4. 
[Figure 1 is about here] 
Skaperdas and Gan (1995) examine a ‘limited liability’ case in which the loser’s payoff is 
independent of the efforts expended. The authors motivate this example by stating that 
contestants may be entrepreneurs who borrow money to spend on research and development and 
thus are not legally responsible in case of loss. The loser of such a contest is unable to repay the 
loan and goes bankrupt. In such a case, 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼1 = −1, and the other parameters in Ω are zero. 
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The best response function for player 𝑖 is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑥𝑗
2 + 𝑊𝑥𝑗 (Figure 1). Under the 
symmetric equilibrium we have 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/3. 
Garfinkel and Skaperdas (2000) consider a case in which two players compete to win a 
war. In this game player 𝑖 and 𝑗 have resource endowments of 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉𝑗 which they can use to 
win the contest. The winner receives the sum of resources minus the sum of efforts expended by 
both players. It is also assumed that war destroys a fraction (1 − 𝜙) ∈ (0,1) of the total payoff. 
Thus, the needed restrictions are 𝑊 = 𝜙(𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑗), 𝛼1 = 𝛽1 = −𝜙, and the other parameters in Ω 
are zero. The best response function is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √(𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑗)𝑥𝑗 (Figure 1, where 𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑗 =
2𝑊). Although 𝑉𝑖 and 𝑉𝑗 can be different, the equilibrium efforts for players 𝑖 and 𝑗 are the same, 
i.e., 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = (𝑉𝑖 + 𝑉𝑗)/4. 
 
3.2. Contests with spillovers 
A simple linear version of the Chung (1996) contest with positive spillovers can be 
captured by Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, 𝑎 − 1, −1, 𝑎, 0}), where 𝑎 ∈ (0,1) is the degree of spillover. The 
corresponding best response function is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗/(1 − 𝑎)and the symmetric 
equilibrium efforts are 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/[4(1 − 𝑎)]. Similarly, a contest of Alexeev and Leitzel 
(1996), where the value of the winning prize decreases with the total effort expenditures, can be 
captured by Γ(𝑖, 𝑗, {𝑊, 0, −1, −1, −1,0}. The resulting best response function is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 +
√𝑊𝑥𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗
2 and the symmetric equilibrium efforts are 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/5.  
Baye et al. (2005) examine and compare several litigation systems under the all-pay 
auction CSF. We use the Tullock lottery CSF in Baye et al. (2005) structure by restricting 𝐿 = 0, 
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𝛼1 = −𝛽, 𝛽1 = −(1 − 𝛼), 𝛼2 = −𝛼, and 𝛽2 = −(1 − 𝛽), where α ∈ (0,1) and 𝛽 ∈ (0,1). 
Interestingly enough, when we restrict the parameters to match their model, the best response 
function 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √𝑊𝑥𝑗/𝛽 is independent of the value of 𝛼. Note that when 𝛽 = 1 (i.e., the 
case of American, Marshall, and Quayle systems of litigation), the best response function as well 
as the symmetric equilibrium turns out to be qualitatively equivalent to that in Tullock (1980). 
Similarly, the two-player versions of other contests by Farmer and Pecorino (1998), Lee 
and Kang (1998), Amegashie (1999), Glazer and Konrad (1999), Garfinkel and Skaperdas 
(2000), Grossman and Mendoza (2001), and Matros and Armanios (2009) can be obtained from 
our generalized contest by placing appropriate parameter restrictions. 
 
4. New contests 
4.1. Contests without spillovers 
In a standard Tullock contest the unit cost of losing is the same as the unit cost of 
winning. However, in many real life situations we observe that the winner of the contest pays 
less than the loser. A prominent example is the government procurement auction for defense 
weapons. Different companies make costly investments to produce prototypes and the 
government shares the prototype’s production cost with only the winner.5 In these cases, the 
winner of the contest faces lower marginal cost than the loser. Rightfully, this contest can be 
called a ‘lazy winner’ contest. We can capture this by setting 𝑊 > 0, 𝛼2 < 𝛼1 < 0 and other 
parameters in Ω to zero. Therefore, the payoff for player 𝑖 is given by 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 + 𝛼1𝑥𝑖          with probability          𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
𝛼2𝑥𝑖                  with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
   (11) 
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The resulting best response function is 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √{(𝛼1 − 𝛼2)𝑥𝑗
2 − 𝑊𝑥𝑗}/𝛼1 and the 
symmetric equilibrium effort levels are 𝑥𝑖
∗ = 𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/(−3𝛼1 − 𝛼2). 
 
4.2. Contests with spillovers 
Next, we consider an ‘input spillover’ contest where the effort expended by player j 
partially benefits player 𝑖 and vice versa. This case can be interpreted as the input spillover effect 
in R&D innovation (Kamien et al., 1992). In our model we assume that the winner (loser) of the 
contest receives a benefit proportional to the loser’s (winner’s) effort. After setting 𝛼1 = 𝛼2 =
−1, and 𝐿 = 0 the payoff function of ‘input spillover’ contest takes the form: 
𝜋𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗) = {
𝑊 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑗         with probability  𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)        
 −𝑥𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑥𝑗               with probability  1 − 𝑝𝑖(𝑥𝑖, 𝑥𝑗)
   (12) 
where 𝛽1 ≥ 0, 𝛽2 ≥ 0, and 𝛽1 − 𝛽2 < 4. 
[Figure 2 is about here] 
Note that the best response function, 𝑥𝑖 = −𝑥𝑗 + √(𝛽1 − 𝛽2)𝑥𝑗
2 + 𝑊𝑥𝑗, changes 
dramatically with 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. The symmetric equilibrium effort of this contest is given by 𝑥𝑖
∗ =
𝑥𝑗
∗ = 𝑊/(4 − 𝛽1 + 𝛽2). Hence, a player expends more (less) effort with an increase in the 
spillover benefit from winning (losing). Figure 2 displays best response functions and resulting 
equilibria for different values of 𝛽1 and 𝛽2. As we move left to right, (𝛽1 − 𝛽2) decreases, and 
the total effort expended also decreases. This has a simple intuition: if the positive externality 
gained by losing increases relative to that of winning then the players will spend less effort to 
win the contest. This case resembles R&D contests in countries where property rights are not 
 10 
protected by the government and the spillover in case of losing is very large. Therefore, there is a 
strong incentive to free ride on the effort of the others. 
5. Discussion 
In this article we construct a generalized Tullock contest under complete information. We 
show how different existing contests in the literature can be nested under this generalized 
structure. We also characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium and show that small parameter 
modifications may lead to substantially different equilibrium effort levels. Finally, we introduce 
and characterize two new contests to the literature. Our results can be applied to the fields of 
labor economics, law and economics, industrial organization, public economics, and political 
economy. By applying certain parameter restrictions to our model one can also imitate the rent-
seeking contests, patent races, military combats, or legal conflicts. 
There are a number of interesting extensions of our analysis. For example, one can use 
our generalized structure to meet a given objective of a contest designer. This objective varies 
between contests. In sports or social benefit programs the designer may want to maximize the 
total expenditures of effort, whereas in rent-seeking or electoral contests the designer may want 
to minimize them. For a given objective, one can appropriately set the parameters of our model 
so that the desired outcome is achieved. Other extensions include contests with more than two 
players, the effects of risk aversion and incomplete information. Finally, it would be interesting 
to test empirically the predictions of our generalized contest model. In particular, our analysis 
demonstrates that small parameter modifications may lead to substantially different equilibrium 
effort levels. To test these predictions, one could design an experiment similar to Sheremeta 
(2010a, 2010b). We leave these questions for future research. 
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Endnotes 
1 Contests are characterized by three attributes such as prizes, players, and the efforts of the 
players (Konrad 2009). 
2 In a first-price all-pay auction the winner is the player who expends the most effort (Baye et al. 
1996). 
3 Chung (1996) is among the first to consider spillover/externality of rival’s efforts in a contest 
framework. Our generalized model differs substantially from Chung’s model. First, Chung 
(1996) uses strictly non-linear spillovers, whereas the current model considers linear spillovers. 
Second, Chung’s model incorporates strictly endogenous prizes and strictly positive spillovers 
from winning (i.e., the winning prize is a strictly increasing and concave function of the total 
effort), whereas the current model captures both positive and negative spillovers from winning 
and from losing. Moreover, the current model captures the cases where the prizes are exogenous, 
or a function of only one of the player's efforts. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out 
the differences. 
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4 Note that the restriction (7) is weaker than the restriction needed for (8) to be well defined. 
Hence, when the best response is positive then solving the best response functions will lead us to 
an equilibrium.   
5 See Kaplan et al. (2002) for a detailed discussion. Matros and Armanios (2009) also study a 
very similar contest. 
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Figures 
Figure 1 – Best response functions and resulting equilibria (W = 1) 
 
Figure 2 – Best response functions for ‘input spillover’ contest (W = 1)  
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